Posts

Use Braces Even For Single Line Statement

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On Feb. 21, 2014, Apple released security update for iOS that affected SSL/TLS connections. The impact is described as "An attacker with a privileged network position may capture or modify data in sessions protected by SSL/TLS." And the CVSS v2 Base Score is 6.8(AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P). What's the problem with it? Here is the Apple code : static OSStatus SSLVerifySignedServerKeyExchange(SSLContext *ctx, bool isRsa, SSLBuffer signedParams, uint8_t *signature, UInt16 signatureLen) { ... if ((err = ReadyHash(&SSLHashSHA1, &hashCtx)) != 0) goto fail; if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &clientRandom)) != 0) goto fail; if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &serverRandom)) != 0) goto fail; if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0) goto fail; goto fail; if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &has...

JEP 115: AES-GCM CipherSuites in JDK 8

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Chengdu, China RFC 5288 describes the use of AES in Galois Counter Mode ( GCM ) (AES-GCM) with various key exchange mechanisms as a cipher suite for TLS. AES-GCM is an authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) cipher (as defined in TLS 1.2 ) providing both confidentiality and data origin authentication. Java SE had already defined the AES-GCM interfaces in Java SE 7 .  In the coming Java SE 8, as an implementation of JEP 115 , AES-GCM algorithms is implemented in SunJCE provider, and AES-GCM cipher suites are implemented in SunJSSE provider. The following SSL/TLS AEAD/GCM cipher suites, in preference order, are enabled by default in SunJSSE provider for TLS version 1.2: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (RFC 5289) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (RFC 5289) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (RFC 5289) TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (RFC 5288) TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (RFC 5289) TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_...

JEP 114: TLS SNI Extension - Virtual Servers Dispatcher

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The implementation of  JEP 114  (TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) Extension) had  integrated into JDK 8  at October, 2012. In  the previous blog entries , we talked about the behavior changes in JSSE, and a few typical user cases . Let's look at a special user case, how to design a virtual server dispatcher in Java. Please refer to javax.net.ssl package of  JDK 8 APIs  for the detailed specification. Prepare the ClientHello Parser Applications need to implementation their own APIs to parser the client hello message from a plaintext socket. Suppose that an application design the following API to do the work, SSLCapabilities and SSLExplorer. SSLCapabilities is defined to show the SSL/TLS security capabilities during handshaking, SSLCapabilities can be retrieved by exploring the network data of an SSL/TLS connection via SSLExplorer.explore(ByteBuffer). /** * Encapsulates the security capabilities * of an SSL/TLS connection. * * Th...

JEP 114: TLS SNI Extension - Typical User Cases

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The implementation of  JEP 114  (TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) Extension) had  integrated into JDK 8  at October, 2012. In  the previous two blog entries , we talked about the behavior changes in JSSE. Let's look at a few typical user cases. Please refer to javax.net.ssl package of  JDK 8 APIs  for the detailed specification. Client side user cases Case C-1: I want to access "www.example.com" Set the host name explicit. SNIHostName serverName = new SNIHostName("www.example.com"); List<SNIServerName> serverNames = new ArrayList<>(1); serverNames.add(serverName); sslParameters.setServerNames(serverNames); It is recommend that the client always specify the host name. Case C-2: I don't want to use server name indication The server side terminates the transaction if server name indication is presented. I cannot use server name indication because of the compatibility issues in server side. Disable the ser...

JEP 114: TLS SNI Extension - SunJSSE Behavior Changes (Continue)

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Students Apartment, Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT), China The implementation of JEP 114 (TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) Extension) had integrated into JDK 8  at October, 2012. In the previous blog entry , we talked about the behavior changes in client and server mode. This blog entry will continue to talk about behavior changes in key manager and trust manager of JSSE. Please refer to javax.net.ssl package of  JDK 8 APIs for the detailed specification. Server Name Indication (SNI) sensitive KeyManager In JDK 7 and previous releases, the KeyManager of server is not server name indication sensitive. The KeyManager of SunJSSE provider does not check the server name indication in order to get the proper key and certificate. In JDK 8, the KeyManager of server of SunJSSE provider will try check the server name indication in extension and select the appropriate keys according to requested server name indication. For example, supposed that there are thre...

JEP 114: TLS SNI Extension - SunJSSE Behavior Changes

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Silver Cave, Guilin, China The implementation of JEP 114 (TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) Extension) had integrated into JDK 8  at October, 2012. This blog entry will talk about some useful behavior changes and user cases that make use of SNI extenstion.  Please refer to javax.net.ssl package of  JDK 8 APIs for the detailed specification. The SNI extension in client mode In JDK 7, if a SSL/TSL connection specified hostname of the server, and when the hostname is fully qualified domain name (FQDN), the hostname will be used as the default server name indication in ClientHello message, implicitly. For example:     SSLSocketFactory factory = ...     SSLSocket sslSocket = factory.createSocket("www.example.com", 443); the hostname, "www.example.com" will appear in the server name indication extension in ClientHello message. While for     SSLSocketFactory factory = ...     SSLSocket sslSocket = factory.createSocket...

TLS Server Name Indication Extension and Unrecognized_name

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Heavy Pond, Jianfengling National Forest Park, Ledong, Hainan, China It's getting hot that some TLS/HTTPS server failed with "unrecognized_name". For example, the Adobe AIR 3 Code Signing Certificate Problem , the ADT handshake alert , and the jarsigner issue with timestamp.geotrust.com , etc. This entry will discussion some background of the "unrecognized_name" alert, and the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) extension. Background "Unrecognized_name" is an error alert, define by RFC4366 .  In section 4 of RFC4366 : - "unrecognized_name": this alert is sent by servers that receive a server_name extension request, but do not recognize the server name. This message MAY be fatal. And in section 3.1 of of RFC4366 : If the server understood the client hello extension but does not recognize the server name, it SHOULD send an "unrecognized_name" alert (which MAY be fatal). From above sections, we see that "unrecognized...

Understanding of OCSP Stapling

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Sun and Moon Pagodas, Shanhu Lake, Guilin, China What's OCSP Stapling? OCSP stapling, also known as the TLS Certificate Status Request extension, is an alternative approach to the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) for checking the revocation status of X.509 digital certificates. It allows the presenter of a certificate to bear the resource cost involved in providing OCSP responses, instead of the issuing Certificate Authority (CA). [ WIKI ] With OCSP stapling, it is the responsibility of the web site to get the OCSP response and send OCSP response to clients/browsers in SSL/TLS handshaking. OCSP stapling is defined as TLS Certificate Status Request extension in section 8 of RFC 6066 . The Benefits of OCSP Stapling The performance bottleneck of OCSP server If client checks the certificate status directly from OCSP server, for each client with a given certificate, the OCSP server has to response with a particular certificate status. For high traf...

Harness SSL and JSSE: Key Size Control

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Aged Bridge, Yulong River, Yangshuo, China Why Key Size Concerns The key size is an important security parameter to determine the strength of cryptography algorithms. For example, RSA keys with fewer than 1024 bits are considered forgeable.  If RSA keys less than 1024 bits are used in X.509 certificates, the private keys used in these certificates can be derived and could allow an attacker to duplicate the certificates and use them fraudulently to spoof content, perform phishing attacks, or perform man-in-the-middle attacks. On August 14, 2012, Microsoft offered an update to Windows that restricts the use of certificates with RSA keys less than 1024 bits in length.  As of October 9, 2012, the update is delivered via automatic update through the Microsoft update service.  Microsoft recommends that customers apply the update at the earliest opportunity. Since JDK 7u12,  RSA keys less than 1024 bits in X.509 certificates are disabled.  This...

NIST Security Strength Time Frames

Security Strength Time Frames of NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Security Strength 80 112 128 192 256 applying processing applying processing through 2010 acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable 2011 through2013 deprecated legacy use acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable 2014 through 2030 disallowed legacy use acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable acceptable 2031 and Beyond disallowed legacy use disallowed legacy use acceptable acceptable acceptable Symmetric Algorithms 2TDEA 3TDEA AES-128 AES-192 AES-256 FFC (e.g., DSA, D-H) L = 1024 N = 160 L = 2048 N = 224 L = 3072 N = 256 L = 7680 N = 384 L = 15360 N = 512 IFC (e.g., RSA) k = 1024 k = 2048 k = 3072 k = 7680 k = 15360 ECC (e.g.,ECDSA) f = 160-223 f = 224-255 f = 256-383 f = 384-511 f = 512+ Digital Signatures and hash-only applications SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-5...

SSL Server Test Online Service

The SSL Server Test Online Service performs a deep analysis of the configuration of any SSL web server on the public Internet. It's a great web service to test the quality of a SSL web server.

Another Challenge of Hash Functions

No comments, please refer to the following docs: "Hash Table Collision Attacks Could Trigger DDoS on a Massive Scale | SecurityWeek.Com" and the research from n.runs AG

Search and Replace Strings in Files Under a Certain Directory

As simple as: $ find thePath -type f -name theFileNamePattern |xargs \ perl -e "s/toBeReplacedString/newString/g" -pi

A proposal to countermeasure BEAST attack

I posted the proposal to countermeasure the BEAST attack in Bug 665814 at Bugzilla@Mozilla. For quick reference, I copy it in the blog: Xuelei Fan 2011-07-20 20:35:42 PDT  Comment 59 : One significant drawback of the current proposed countermeasure (sending empty application data packets) is that the empty packet might be rejected by the TLS peer (see comments #30/#50/others: MSIE does not accept empty fragments, Oracle application server (non-JSSE) cannot accept empty fragments, etc.) We've been looking at a slightly different countermeasure that should comply with the TLSv1.0/SSLv3.0 specifications, and likely won't break implementations. Would you please review the following proposal? If this is sound, this might avoid the empty packet issue, and the switches necessary to configure it. Looking at the spec of TLS, the block-ciphered structure is defined as: block-ciphered struct { opaque co...

Java SE 7 New Features Ed 1 course

The first of the Java SE 7 courses - D72697GC10 - Java SE 7 New Features Ed 1 is now on the public schedule on education.oracle.com .

JSSE Oracle Provider Default Disabled TLS Cipher Suites

The following TLS cipher suites are supported by Oracle provider, SunJSSE. These cipher suites are disabled by default because of one of the following reasons: obsoleted weak cipher suites anonymous cipher suites no encryption cipher suites (null cipher) Kerberos cipher suites Cipher suites for Kerberos (KRB5) need additional KRB5 service configuration, and these cipher suites are not common in practice. You are NOT supposed to use these cipher suites unless you really know what you're doing from a standpoint. Perference Value Description 1 0x00,0x6D TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 2 0xC0,0x19 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 3 0x00,0x3A TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 4 0x00,0x6C TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 5 0xC0,0x18 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 6 0x00,0x34 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 7 0xC0,0x16 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 8 0x00,0...

Java™ SE 7 Release Security Enhancements - Weak Cryptography Control

Weak cryptographic algorithms can now be disabled in Java SE 7 release. The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm was disabled by default in Sun PKIX provider and SunJSSE provider. The MD2 algorithm is a cryptographic hash function developed by Ronald Rivest in 1989 , and was published in 1992 as an Informational RFC (RFC 1319) .; RFC 6149 moves RFC 1319/MD2 to historic status, "Since its publication, MD2 has been shown to not be collision-free, albeit successful collision attacks for properly implemented MD2 are not that damaging. Successful pre-image and second pre-image attacks against MD2 have been shown." Although MD2 is no longer considered secure, it remains in use in public key infrastructures as part of certificates generated with MD2 and RSA. An a countermeasure of the vulnerability, Java SE has disabled MD2 algorithm in certification path building and validation. You may wonder, Java SE has disabled MD2 algorithm in certification path building and validation in ...

Time of ECC Algorithms in Web Services?

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It's a question, the answer depends on your application deployment. The browser market share in the following pie may be a fact of your consideration. From previous posts, I learned that out of the major market players, only Opera does not support ECC TLS cipher suites yet.

Oracle Launches Java 7

Source: www.oracle.com. Oracle Announces Availability of Java SE 7 , you are able to download and try Java SE 7 right now. You may also want to know Java™ SE 7 Release Security Enhancements . I may publish new post to introduce the new security features in the blog. Stay Tuned!

JSSE Oracle Provider Preference of TLS Cipher Suites

Perference Order Value Description 1 0xC0,0x24 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 2 0xC0,0x28 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 3 0x00,0x3D TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 4 0xC0,0x26 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 5 0xC0,0x2A TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 6 0x00,0x6B TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 7 0x00,0x6A TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 8 0xC0,0x0A TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 9 0xC0,0x14 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 10 0x00,0x35 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 11 0xC0,0x05 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 12 0xC0,0x0F TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 13 0x00,0x39 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 14 0x00,0x38 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 15 0xC0,0x23 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 16 0xC0,0x27 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_1...