Browser Safari Preference of TLS Cipher Suites

Perference Order Value Description
1 0x00,0x2F TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
2 0x00,0x35 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
3 0x00,0x05 TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
4 0x00,0x0A TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
5 0xC0,0x13 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
6 0xC0,0x14 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
7 0xC0,0x09 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
8 0xC0,0x0A TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
9 0x00,0x32 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
10 0x00,0x38 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
11 0x00,0x13 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
12 0x00,0x04 TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5

Note that the data was from the observation of the TLS ClientHello message when visiting a HTTPS web site from Safari 5.1.

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